Root command and argument injection
P-01, P-06, P-07, P-25 and P-41 remove unsafe shell boundaries, validate privileged arguments and constrain identity transitions.
DH20.01 closes 51 verified security issues across root execution, log parsing, remote inputs, filesystem races, web panels, clustering, process identity, DNS and firewall recovery.
Each class is linked to public P-numbered remediations, negative tests and regression evidence in the signed release.
P-01, P-06, P-07, P-25 and P-41 remove unsafe shell boundaries, validate privileged arguments and constrain identity transitions.
P-09, P-19, P-33, P-43 and P-49 bound line length, allocation, regex work, output, concurrency and procfs scanning.
P-03, P-22, P-32 and P-34 bind sensitive work to verified files, owners and inodes instead of reusable paths.
P-02, P-05, P-15, P-16, P-18, P-40 and P-42 authenticate releases, constrain archives and retain a last-known-good state.
P-10, P-11, P-31, P-36, P-38 and P-51 protect rendering, state changes, templates, webroots and native panel permissions.
P-20 authenticates and frames cluster traffic, detects replay and applies strict connection, message and work limits.
P-44 through P-50 defend against PID reuse, procfs field shifting, PGID/SID confusion, pignore abuse and unsafe lock recovery.
P-17, P-35, O-02 and O-03 make rule changes transactional and preserve reply traffic, rollback state and Docker-owned policy.
P-27 through P-30 separate display data from authorisation, canonicalise PTR values and bound resolver work and caches.
The fixes combine into a coherent model for release integrity, untrusted input, privilege boundaries and active firewall state.
Pinned RSA-3072 trust, SHA-256-signed manifests, strict HTTPS and explicit rollback checks protect the release path.
Length, record and work limits prevent untrusted log input from consuming unbounded parser resources.
Sensitive operations use validated arguments, controlled environments and checked identity transitions.
Blocklists, archives and templates are accepted only through canonical URLs and verified transport.
No-follow handling, ownership checks and inode binding reduce symlink, hardlink and replacement races.
Candidate rules are validated before activation, with controlled recovery if application fails.
Cluster messages are authenticated, replay-aware, framed and subject to strict resource limits.
Resolver responses are bounded, validated and cached without turning stale data into silent trust.
Each remediation is paired with negative tests, regression coverage and checks on supported operating-system families.
Identify the input, trust boundary and failure consequence.
Reproduce abuse in a controlled environment.
Apply the smallest change that removes the vulnerability class.
Automate the evidence that prevents recurrence.
Send DCSF suggestions, compatibility reports and reproducible technical problems to dat@etop.pl.
Key information about the first production release.
Yes. DH20.01 is the latest and most hardened release in the DCSF line. It maps to signed technical package 15.10.4 and includes 51 verified security fixes plus three operational controls.
DCSF supports cPanel & WHM, DirectAdmin, CyberPanel, CWP, InterWorx, VestaCP and Webmin, plus a generic mode for supported RHEL- and Debian-family Linux servers.
The public register covers command and argument injection, ReDoS and resource exhaustion, file races, update-chain substitution, web-panel abuse, cluster spoofing and replay, process identity bypasses, DNS trust errors and firewall-state loss.
Yes. DH20.01 is public and maps to the signed DCSF 15.10.4 package. The bootstrap verifies every trust-bearing artifact before installation.